Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Brain states: In philosophy, "brain state" refers to the specific configuration and activity of neurons and synapses at a given moment, corresponding to mental experiences and functions. See also Brain, Thinking, Consciousness, Experiences.
_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

David Chalmers on Brain/Brain State - Dictionary of Arguments

I XI
Brain/Chalmers: how could a physical system such as a brain also be an experiencer? Why should there be something like how it is to be such a system?
>Experience
, >Knowledge how, >Consciousness/Chalmers.
I 115
Brain/Neurobiology/Neurophysiology/Awareness/Explanation/Chalmers: There are approaches by Francis Crick and Christof Koch (1990) (1) on 40 Hertz oscillation...
I 116
...and by Gerald Edelman (1989) (2) who explain the phenomenal side of consciousness just as little as cognitive models.
>Cognition/Chalmers.
I 238
Brain state/Chalmers: what are the physical correlations to conscious experiences?
Crick and Koch (1990): Thesis: 40 Hertz oscillations in the cortex are the neural correlates of the experience.
Baars (1988) (3): thesis: a global "work space" is the basis for information processing of experiences in which the contents correspond directly to the contents of the work space.
Farah (1994) (4) Thesis: Consciousness is associated with high-quality representations in the brain.
Libet (1993) (5) Thesis: Consciousness is associated with neuronal activities that last long enough, with the minimum duration being about 500 milliseconds.


1. F. H. C. Crick and C. Koch, Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. Seminars in the Neurosciences 2, 1990: pp. 263-75
2. G. Edelman, The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness. New York 1989.
3. B. J. Baars, A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness, Cambridge 1988
4. M. Farah, Visual perception and visual awareness after brain damage. In: C. Umilta and M. Moscovitch (Eds) Conscious and Nonconsious Information Processing: Attention and Performance 15, Cambridge 1994
5. B. Libet, The neural time factor in conscious and unconscious events. IN: Experimental and Theoretical studies of Consciousness. Ciba Foundation Symposium 174. New York 1993.

_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


Send Link
> Counter arguments against Chalmers
> Counter arguments in relation to Brain/Brain State

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  



Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-29
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration